

IN THE PURSUIT OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNANCE AND PEACE DEVELOPMENT

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**IN THE PURSUIT OF
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNANCE AND PEACE DEVELOPMENT**

by

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ABSTRACT

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In recent military operations, the United States has learned some difficult lessons at the tragic cost of American lives. To succeed in such operations, we must face the reality, that although developing an international capacity for sound representative governance is difficult; it is necessary in order to win the peace and create future partners. In order to create capacities for representative governance and peace, we must be better prepared with an experienced, networked team of professionals who are able to create unified action across the whole-of-government. We need foreign policy that reflects clear leadership and assumes a holistic approach across the full spectrum of operations. This paper proposes restructuring the United States administration in order to avoid the mistakes specifically made in preparation for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – Phase IV, and those associated with irregular, asymmetric conflicts we have faced over the last fifteen plus years. The proposed new Department of Representative Governance and Peace Development, initiated by a National Security Act for the 21st century, will enhance our capability to prevail in Afghanistan and restore our international image as a strong and effective global superpower.

IN THE PURSUIT OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNANCE AND PEACE DEVELOPMENT

The challenges of the 21st century are increasingly unconventional and transnational, and therefore demand a response that effectively integrates all aspects of American power.

—President Barack Obama¹

The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union were seen as the closing days of a 45-year Cold War. The United States was hopeful for peace and prosperity around the world. However, expectations of a peace dividend were soon shattered by instability within ungoverned areas of the world and failing nation-states. These ungoverned territories and failing nation-states then became breeding grounds for ideological terrorists such as al-Qaeda. Presidents George H.W. Bush and William Clinton were faced with complex decisions regarding the level of support and possible intervention in these troubled areas such as northern and southern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda. Some of the areas required humanitarian aid, some required security, and most required the complete development of a nation.

Throughout American history, when the military has been called upon to fight our nation's wars, the military succeeded. However, in order to develop capacities for sound representative governance and enduring peace in troubled countries, the United States can no longer afford to rely solely on military operations. As General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, has admitted, "Our traditional training model, still shuddering from the echo of our Cold War mentality, has infused our organization to think in only kinetic terms. This [task of developing governance] demands new modalities of thinking."² Historically, there has been a clearly identified strategic

transition from military combat operations to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) activities. While achieving some success in the short term, the rapid shift towards SSTR operations often times left many long term strategic problems unsolved.³ President John F. Kennedy advised that we “must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military power alone.”⁴ Using all elements of national power provides a greater likelihood of success.⁵

In order to pursue representative governance and peace development, the United States must employ an experienced, networked team of professionals; practiced in diplomacy, information operations and communication, economics and finance, intelligence, and the rule of law. A well-orchestrated team of professionals formed from the associated government agencies should be combined under a single department with clear leadership and a holistic approach. Assembling a multi-functional capability under one department will create a synergistic “full spectrum” approach. General Chiarelli acknowledges that “the full-spectrum campaign approach forces the imperative of achieving balance across multiple lines of operations.”⁶

Failures of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – Phase IV

Aversion to Nation Building and Post-Hostility Peace-Operations. Our inability to coordinate a cohesive, interagency plan to transition from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Phase III to Phase IV led to four years of instability and near collapse of the Iraqi government as well as a loss of countless American lives.⁷

How did a superpower such as the United States, with a military that was far superior to any military in the world, fail to follow through with measures to achieve peace and re-establish the Iraqi government in May of 2003? To answer this question,

one has to begin with a look back at United States strategic policies and strategies since the end of the Vietnam War and consider the Defense Department's growing aversion to conduct nation building and post-hostility peace operations. Responding to the tragic outcome of the Vietnam War, the "American Way of War" was sanctioned under the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine during the 1980s and 1990s.⁸ According to the new U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,

Reagan-era officials maintained that military force should be limited to the attainment of U.S. vital interests; a clear political determination to win militarily; clearly defined political and military objectives, with broad public and congressional support as 'reasonably' assured; and, as a last resort, military force could be used in an overwhelming fashion to decisively defeat the enemy.⁹

Based on the lessons learned from the Vietnam War, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine implied that the United States should not engage in counter insurgencies, peace operations, and nation building where clearly defined end-states were problematic or unattainable with military forces. However, the lessons of Vietnam were unfortunately relearned in October 1993 during Operation GOTHIC SERPENT when we lost eighteen American Soldiers and two Task Force 160th Blackhawk helicopters in Mogadishu, Somalia.¹⁰ After this tragedy, the Pentagon resisted deployments of the military to operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti.¹¹ America had lost her will to become entangled in nation building and attempted to limit military deployments to conventional campaigns such as Operation DESERT STORM with clearly defined end-states and exit strategies.

The American Way of War was clean and provided for clear and decisive victory. So, clean wars became the "fun wars" and the only ones worth fighting.¹² Strategist Edward Luttwak offers a revealing comparison, "It's like the hospital that does not want

to admit patients. Some hospital administrators want the perfect state of maximum readiness, and patients make a mess.”¹³ But on 11 September 2001, the enemy brought the fight to America, and the United States no longer had the liberty to fight the “fun” wars or “clean wars.” Al-Qaeda had made a mess and forced the United States to engage in a “dirty war” with an amorphous enemy. In retaliation, the United States prepared to fight back. Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) would prove to be anything but clean wars. Culturally pre-disposed toward conventional operations, the United States stumbled into nation building after overwhelmingly successful maneuver warfare.

Defense Department vs. State Department. Considering the overwhelming achievements by the military in October-November 2001 in Afghanistan and March-April 2003 in Iraq, it was evident that the military knew how to plan and fight conventional operations. However, the Defense Department expected post-hostility missions to be done by the State Department. In fact, according to Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, authors of *Cobra II*, “CENTCOM [Central Command] planners had been told early on that others in the government would assume the principal responsibilities for Phase IV.”¹⁴ General Tommy Franks himself told his staff in the months leading up to OIF that planning for the “unknown that would follow the ouster of Saddam Hussein” was a State Department task.¹⁵ Nonetheless, he admitted that he “was aware that Phase IV might well prove more challenging than major combat operations.”¹⁶ Clearly, as Thomas E. Ricks observed in *Fiasco*, “General Franks appeared to believe that planning for the end of the war was someone else’s job.”¹⁷ “He had planned only for the invasion, not for postconflict operations,” added Hans

Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, editors of *Civilian Surge*.¹⁸ But all this changed when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared “the Defense Department would take the lead in all postwar efforts. Thereafter, all references to the State Department disappeared from the organizational chart.”¹⁹

Although the State Department had been specifically responsible for post-war development in Bosnia and Kosovo, President George W. Bush and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice approved of the Defense Secretary’s plan. This was the first time since the end of World War II that Defense was responsible for post-war SSTR and development of governance. Unfortunately, the Pentagon did not possess the knowledge base or familiarity it needed to accomplish these tasks, even though the Defense Department had a budget that greatly exceeded that of the State Department.²⁰ Tom Ricks believes, “The decision to place the Defense Department... in charge of postwar Iraq may have doomed the American effort from the start.”²¹ Further, citing an unpublished RAND Corporation study faxed to the Secretary of Defense on 8 February 2005 from RAND Corporation’s president and chief executive officer, James Thompson, Ricks reported, “The Defense Department lacked the experience, expertise, funding authority, local knowledge, and established contacts with other potential organizations needed to establish, staff, support and oversee a large multiagency civilian mission.”²² Regrettably, the Defense Department received this mission simply because the State Department did not have the personnel and funding to accomplish the mission.²³ For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), a State Department agency, had reduced their post Vietnam work force of 12,000 down to a

force of 2,000.²⁴ Essentially, the United States lacked capability within the Defense Department and capacity within the State Department.

Not only was there a lack of capability within Defense and capacity within State, there was also an apparent reluctance to develop a cooperative relationship between the two departments. This ineffective relationship, which essentially began after the conclusion of World War II (WWII),²⁵ was also reflected by Secretary of State Colin Powell who expressed reservations on the operational plans developed by the Defense Department. Gordon and Trainor, quoting Secretary Powell avowed, "If Rumsfeld wanted to be the man in charge of the messy aftermath that was fine with his rival at the State Department."²⁶ Paradoxically, this confrontational relationship left the military with the sole responsibility for employing the full spectrum of national power which they were unprepared, unwilling, and culturally averse.²⁷ Had cohesive, coordinated planning been conducted between Defense and State in the months prior to OIF, many of the miscalculations committed after Phase III could have been avoided and representative governance and peace development begun much earlier. However, without a clear, coordinated, and unified effort between the Departments of Defense and State, the American military marched forward into battle prepared to win the war, but with no clear vision of how to win the peace.²⁸ To avoid future strategic mistakes, the United States must resolve the existing discord within the interagencies and develop policies and an organizational framework in order to better pursue representative governance and peace development.

The Battle for Force Levels During Phase IV. It has been well-documented that General Eric Shinseki, then Army Chief of Staff, warned Congress that it would take a

significant military force to secure the peace.²⁹ However, Secretary Rumsfeld envisioned the Iraq campaign to be fought like Afghanistan was – with a “transformational” force that was relatively small and able to secure a rapid victory and quick transition to host nation governance. The Joint Chiefs, to include former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Secretary Powell, were also questioning the planned troop levels for OIF. Nevertheless, Secretary Rumsfeld was looking for speed in order to achieve a quick victory and a small operational force footprint.³⁰

The real difficulty with the force levels had to do with Phase IV. Although the original force levels were significantly reduced for the initial invasion, the additional troops identified to be sent after Baghdad fell were critical to SSTR. “But the two top civilians at the Pentagon remained skeptical. ‘I don’t see why it would take more troops to occupy the country than to take down the regime,’ [Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul] Wolfowitz said.”³¹ Indeed, instead of the more than 300,000 troops that General Shinseki recommended to win the peace during Phase IV, there were only 37,350 troops available for the mission in May 2003.³² Marine General Anthony Zinni, a former Commander of Central Command, clearly advised that it would take a greater number of forces to win the peace than to take down Sadaam Hussein and his Republican Guard.³³ However, in the judgment of Secretary Rumsfeld, General Zinni represented pre-transformational thinking, and he was not receptive of General Zinni’s advice.³⁴

Despite Secretary Rumsfeld’s dismissal of General Zinni’s views, the Secretary, along with both Central Command and the Joint Staff, realized that planning by the Joint Task Force (JTF) responsible for Phase IV in Iraq, (JTF-IV), was uncoordinated and off track.³⁵ Deputy Chief of Plans for Central Command, Army Colonel John Agoglia

admitted, “We didn’t prepare Franks so well for the reconstruction and stabilization piece... In January ‘03 we realized that JTF-IV wouldn’t work. It was broken.”³⁶ So, only eight weeks prior to the invasion, Secretary Rumsfeld relieved Central Command of its Phase IV responsibilities and handed the task over to retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner. Since the end of October 2002, responsibility for Phase IV had changed hands three times: from the State Department to the Defense Department, then to retired Lieutenant General Garner.

This type of planning effort and timing was a far cry from the successful postwar planning conducted during World War II. The Allied planning for postwar operations in Germany, known as Operation ECLIPSE, began two years prior to Germany’s surrender in May 1945.³⁷ Planning for postwar operations in Japan began as early as February 1942, three years before their surrender in August 1945.³⁸ Unfortunately, it was apparent that no one was heeding the advice of Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, authors of *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*. This U.S. Army War College report specifically warned, “Detailed long-term interagency planning for occupation is important, and can considerably smooth transition.”³⁹ Instead, planning for Phase IV operations was done at the last minute in an uncoordinated way among interagencies, with very little concern for anticipated force levels required when Sadaam Hussein’s regime fell.

By 8 April 2003, the American military had entered Baghdad and dismantled the Iraqi military in just three short weeks. But now came the difficult task of transitioning from war to peace and providing for SSTR. Crane and Terrill also noted, “National objectives can often be accomplished only after the fighting has ceased; a war tactically

and operationally 'won' can still lead to strategic 'loss' if post-conflict operations are poorly planned or executed."⁴⁰ Due to the uncoordinated efforts and flawed Phase IV planning between State and Defense, post-invasion objectives were doomed to fail before the military campaign commenced. Anthony H. Cordesman, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted planners prepared "for the war it wanted to fight and not for the 'peace' that was certain to follow."⁴¹ Cordesman continued, listing several OIF planning failures in *American Strategic Mistakes, Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success*:

- The failure to create and provide anything approaching the kind and number of civilian elements in the U.S. government necessary for ...stability operations.⁴²
- The failure to plan and execute efforts to maintain the process of governance at the local, provincial, and central level.⁴³
- The creation of only a small cadre of civilians and military in the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), many initially recruited only for three-month tours. Effective civil-military coordination never took place between ORHA and the U.S. command during or after the war, and its mission was given so little initial priority that it did not even come to Baghdad until April 21, 2003 – twelve days after U.S. forces [entered Baghdad] – on the grounds that it did not have suitable security.⁴⁴
- Replacing ORHA after the fall of Saddam Hussein with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and suddenly improvising a vast nation building and stability effort, recruiting for and funding such an operation with little time for planning.⁴⁵

Changing Direction Again: Garner – Bremer. The uncoordinated and truncated Phase IV plans were now going to be put to the test. Within weeks, it was apparent the Defense Secretary was not happy with the efforts of Jay Garner, so he initiated a fourth change of direction: General Garner was replaced by Ambassador Paul L. Bremer III by 7 May 2003.⁴⁶

Ambassador Bremer had just been in Washington and received situational briefings regarding Iraq by representatives of the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury. In addition, he had received detailed briefings from both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, as he arrived in Baghdad on 12 May 2003, he quickly realized that he had a great deal to learn about the operational and strategic environment as the country was still in turmoil with looting and sectarian violence.⁴⁷ As he sat down to take his initial in-country briefings, he lamented, "Nobody had given me a sense of how utterly broken this country was."⁴⁸ What is disturbing about this admission was that he was acknowledging this concern nearly two weeks after major combat operations had been completed. Although Ambassador Bremer may have been thoroughly briefed before his arrival in Iraq, his critical Phase IV team should have been in theater preparing for its mission well prior to major combat operations. In comparison to similar post-hostility preparation that took place two years prior to the end of WWII, it seemed the majority of research and groundwork for OIF Phase IV would have begun at least as early as mid-December 2001, when planning began in earnest for the Iraq invasion.⁴⁹

The Errors of Bremer. The task of undoing the errors of the first year of Iraqi occupation led by Ambassador Bremer and his Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was overwhelming. The critical and devastating decisions made by his team, along with policymakers working with Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, created an unstable and highly volatile Iraq for the next four years.⁵⁰

Despite General Franks' and Lieutenant General Michael DeLong's (Deputy Commander, Central Command) recommendation to Bremer to retain portions of the

Ba'ath Party,⁵¹ Bremer decreed Order No. 1: "De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society," relying on Feith's advice.⁵² This meant that the top four echelons of leadership within the Baath Party were banned from holding government positions.⁵³ In the view of General Franks and Lieutenant General DeLong, "Any hope for a seamless transition of power depended on the participation of certain segments of the Ba'ath Party."⁵⁴ They recommended firing only... "senior-level membership, politicians, and other Saddam loyalists." They further advised the "selective amnesty for lower-level party members, especially the 'blue collar' power workers," in order to keep the national infrastructure operating.⁵⁵ Ignoring the dire consequences of dismissing the only civil employees with the knowledge to run the country's infrastructure, Bremer left the people of Iraq without thousands of teachers, doctors, engineers and experts in the fields of oil, water and electricity.⁵⁶ Moreover, by launching total de-Ba'athification, Bremer alienated more than 30,000 Iraqis.⁵⁷ It was expected that up to 60,000 lost their jobs, despite the fact that many Iraqi's had to claim loyalty to the Ba'ath party in order to get a job under Saddam Hussein's cruel dictatorship.⁵⁸

Beyond the ravage of de-Ba'athification, the most devastating decision made by Under Secretary of Defense Feith and Ambassador Bremer was the decision to demobilize the Iraqi Army.⁵⁹ Order No. 2: "The Dissolution of Entities," was issued by Bremer on 23 May 2003. This order officially eliminated the Iraqi army, the Ministry of Defense, and the entire Iraqi intelligence agency.⁶⁰ Disbanding the old Iraqi Army was exactly what the Kurds and Ahmad Chalabi, an exiled Iraqi leader and close ally of the Pentagon, were hoping for.⁶¹ The Army of Iraq included nearly seven percent of the entire workforce. When their families were taken into consideration, this single decision

enacted an economic catastrophe on approximately 2.5 million people, nearly ten percent of the Iraqi population.⁶² Army War College scholars, Conrad Crane and W. Andrew Terrill warned that disbanding “the [Iraqi] Army in the war’s aftermath could lead to the destruction of one of the only forces for unity within the society.”⁶³ Clearly, this decision was unfortunately influenced by the Pentagon’s misguided trust in Chalabi. Lieutenant General DeLong believed Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz had “put too much weight on the promises of Iraqi exiles, Ahmad Chalabi most [of] all.”⁶⁴ Some of this confidence could have been due to Wolfowitz and Chalabi attending graduate school together.⁶⁵

Although many believe the United States began to lose the peace in May 2003, the poorly developed Phase IV plan, coupled with an inability to coordinate efforts among U.S. government agencies and multiple agency lead changes actually portended failure well prior to crossing the line of departure on 19 March 2003. When post-hostilities began on 1 May 2003, the military was called upon to transition from warfighting to the development of sound Iraqi governance and stability regrettably without satisfactory, cohesive, civilian representation, support, and expertise – all needed to effectively transition to winning the peace.

Ineffective Coordination and an Untimely Resignation. Coordinating efforts in the months immediately following the fall of Sadaam were troublesome. Resignations within Central Command jeopardized a smooth transition from military operations to civilian-led operations. Just as General Lucius Clay (Deputy Military Governor, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force [SHAEF]) replaced General Eisenhower in Europe on 18 April 1945 so Eisenhower could return home for leave and victory tours,⁶⁶

General Franks soon returned home to the United States in May 2003 in order to prepare for retirement on 1 July 2003.⁶⁷ No one doubts that these leaders deserved rest after major combat operations. But in the case of General Frank's departure, the timing became problematic due to the replacement of Lieutenant General Garner by Ambassador Bremer during this same time period. Essentially, after the two wars, the leaders who commanded the war effort left the theater as heroes while a replacement leader was left to win the peace.

Two to three years of preparation by the military prior to the end of World War II, led ultimately to a successful transition to peace over the next ten years. Even with proven success, President Truman believed "the military should not have governmental responsibilities beyond the requirements of military operations."⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the civilians within the interagencies were not prepared to assume all the tasks the military conducted during OIF in large part because of the lack of synchronization among departments within the administration. One could argue that the United States was unprepared to employ all the elements of national power in such a multidimensional environment.⁶⁹ "In essence, we went to war with a military and interagency construct that was not prepared for the imperatives of full-spectrum operations and counterinsurgency warfare," according to General Chiarelli.⁷⁰

What may develop once the United States has completely departed Iraq and had the advantage of hindsight to review the lessons learned, is a new foreign-assistance competence that is able to professionally answer the call to solve international crises. Acknowledging the poor OIF–Phase IV planning and preparation, Congress now realizes that the civilian foreign-assistance capability is ineffective and requires a

comprehensive full spectrum, whole-of-government solution. To succeed in this endeavor, according to Johanna Mendelson Forman, one of the authors of *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, “The United States will have to abandon its Cold War approach to foreign assistance” and build “more agile and appropriate institutional mechanisms to respond to crises with the entire complement of U.S. national power.”⁷¹ While these reform efforts will no doubt influence how well these operations are conducted, the strategic question is should they be conducted in the first place?

Iraq 2004 – Afghanistan 2009

Should the United States evangelize its national values throughout the world or simply exemplify freedom, independence, and democracy as called for by President John Quincy Adams in his 4 July 1821 address,

Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her [America’s] heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.⁷²

A New Dilemma. In “Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma,” Philip Cerny predicts, “The New Security Dilemma means that as the reliability of interstate balances of power declines ...we can expect substate and crossborder destabilization and violence, including but certainly not confined to terrorism, to become increasingly endemic.”⁷³ Since the end of the Cold War and specifically since early 2004, the imbalance of power, international destabilization, and opposing ideologies require American resolve to deter and prevent attacks. The United States no longer is able to simply be a “well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all” – too much is given, too much is expected. As the sole superpower of the world, the United States is expected to answer geo-strategic challenges and solve the new security dilemma.⁷⁴

The “new security dilemma” demands the United States undertake operations that prevent and preclude attacks while also planning for asymmetric threats across the spectrum of conflict. The types of threats the United States confronts today have exponentially increased. The enemy of the 21st century is global, often faceless, and fights passionately for its perceived ideals. This type of enemy requires creative thinking, adaptive planning, and flexible operations to counter this new brand of adversary. Army Lieutenant General (Retired) David W. Barno advises that “Only through integrated and coherent responses across all elements of national power can we hope to overcome adversaries operating in this new battlespace.”⁷⁵

The Challenges of Asymmetric / Hybrid Warfare. According to Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan, authors of “America and the Use of Force: Sources of Legitimacy,” “From 1989 to 2003 the United States intervened with significant military force on nine occasions – Panama (1989), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995-6), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (1991, 1998, 2003), an average of one large-scale military intervention every 18 months.”⁷⁶ By early 2004, the United States recognized that asymmetric warfare was having a profound impact on the projection of national power. After all, while conducting asymmetric, complex contingency missions from 1990 to 2006, the United States lost four times the lives that it did fighting conventional operations.⁷⁷

For the purpose of definition, asymmetric, irregular warfare, also known as hyper-complex or hybrid warfare, consists of humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) missions, stabilization and reconstruction missions, insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare, terrorism and counter terrorism as well as post-hostility SSTR missions such as

individual nation-state capacity development for representative governance and peace. While hybrid warfare is not a new operational context, globalization and trans-national threats have served to make it endemic to the 21st century.⁷⁸ No longer can the United States effectively deter non-state actors in a hybrid environment using only military power, unassisted by effective diplomacy.⁷⁹ The hybrid environments we face today, replete with requirements to develop and build nations from the ground up, require other elements of national power. However, the other U.S. governmental agencies have not concomitantly transitioned at the same pace.⁸⁰ The asymmetric environment or hybrid warfare of the 21st century requires the United States to develop the capacity for representative governance within failing or failed nation-states in order to protect the United States and establish a lasting peace. However, according to Hans Binnendijk and Patrick Cronin, “the United States still lacks many of the capacities, processes, mechanisms, and resources required to effectively conduct complex operations – those operations that require close civil-military planning and cooperation in the field.”⁸¹

The pursuit of sound governance and lasting peace often requires an international capacity for representative governance and peace development while waging hybrid, asymmetric warfare. Democracy in and of itself provides a remedy for many of the conditions that afflict failed or failing states. Although evangelizing democracy requires a coordinated effort by our national elements of power far beyond the military, synchronized efforts across the “Three Ds’ of diplomacy, defense, and development,” according to Lieutenant General Barno, could prove effective in developing representative governance and peace.⁸²

Why Promote Democracy. Democracy creates the utmost capacity for freedom and prosperity in addition to the protection of individual rights. In “Democracies of the World Unite,” Ivo Daalder and James Lindsey claim,

The largest twenty democracies are responsible for three-quarters of the resources spent on defense in the world today. Democracies also account for most of the world’s wealth, innovation and productivity. Twenty-eight of the world’s thirty largest economies are democracies. The average annual income of people living in democratic societies is about \$16,000, nearly three times greater than the average income of those living in the non-democracies. In the main, the people living in democracies are better educated, more prosperous, healthier and happier than those who live under authoritarian and dictatorial rule. Harnessing the power that comes from this overwhelming military, economic, political and social advantage would provide the necessary ingredients for effective international action.⁸³

President Obama recently said, “History offers a clear verdict: *governments that respect the will of their own people* are more prosperous, more stable, and more successful than governments that do not.”⁸⁴ In essence, representative governance “of the people, by the people, for the people” creates a better peace.⁸⁵

A Better Peace. Sir Basil Liddell Hart concludes that “The object in war is to attain a better peace.”⁸⁶ Truly professional and effective war plans include consideration for achieving military victory and establishing a lasting peace after combat operations.⁸⁷ Evangelizing democracy or “*governments that respect the will of their own people*” will undoubtedly achieve a better peace.⁸⁸ However, in order to challenge the hybrid threats that exist in the asymmetric environments of modern war, the United States must set the conditions for a better peace through unified action from capable and coordinated interagency actors. The United States must be ready to intervene in failing or failed states, and develop governments that can be prosperous in the global economy and become future partners in peace. By focusing on developing viable and prosperous nations, the United States ensures its own security and worldwide legitimacy. Reliance

on military centric conventional operations is insufficient to secure long lasting peace and also alienates current and potential allies. Moreover, by developing permanent relationships with candidate nations with a corresponding strategy focused on improving economic viability and prosperity and establishing stability, we can promote our values and secure a better peace. If we cannot, according to Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan, “the steady denial of international legitimacy by fellow democracies will eventually become debilitating and perhaps even paralyzing.”⁸⁹

More than a Military. Historically, the U.S. military has been optimized to conduct conventional operations to fight and win its nation’s wars. Nevertheless, there is a growing recognition that the military must be prepared to address SSTR missions.⁹⁰ In Iraq, the Iraqis’ destruction of their own country and its historical artifacts through lawlessness and looting was a direct result of the United States’ failure to provide civil order. Because the United States was not prepared for OIF–Phase IV, it created a void in stability. “According to one Iraqi insurgent, the failure of U.S. forces to provide security motivated him to take up arms.”⁹¹ That same individual advised, “They should have come and just given us food and some security.”⁹² Similarly, in Afghanistan, General McChrystal directed that “our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support of the people, every action we take must enable this effort.”⁹³ Obtaining the support of the people will require more than conventional military operations if we are to regain our legitimacy and credibility.⁹⁴ In the future, concurrent with defeating an insurgency militarily and providing the necessary security and stability, the United States must address the social, political, and economic requirements of the host nation. Failure to do so, can lead to long-term strategic failure.⁹⁵ Success will

require a whole-of-government approach across the full spectrum of national power: Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy, Finance, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement (DIME-FIL) in order to achieve victory in both war and peace.⁹⁶

A New Direction

Military Power vs. DIME-FIL. Former Secretary of State George Shultz asked, “How do we preserve peace in a world of nations where the use of military power is an all-too-common feature of life?”⁹⁷ Indeed, Clausewitz proclaimed that “every other consideration should be subordinated to the aim of fighting a decisive battle.”⁹⁸ However, in the 21st century, the decisive battle is not necessarily won by massing forces or acquiring superior firepower. As we win peace in the asymmetric environment, village by village, the decisive battle is won when a Marine or diplomat feeds a child, communicates with a tribal leader in his native language, or resolves to protect and defend a home and family in his small Area of Responsibility (AOR). In November 2007, Secretary Gates “pointed to the ‘asymmetric-warfare challenge’ U.S. forces face in the field and insisted that ‘success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping the behavior of friends, adversaries, and, most importantly, the people in between.’”⁹⁹ Integrating military capabilities with U.S. interagency partners improves the likelihood of strategic success when conducting complex asymmetric contingency operations. By fully implementing a balanced whole-of-government approach, the United States will sear an indelible mark of genuine development. Additionally, by harmonizing each of the elements of national power under one Secretary with the capability to achieve comprehensive, synergistic effectiveness, the United States will ensure a more seamless synchronized policy and strategy.

A Call to Full Spectrum Operations. Strategic planners go down a perilous path when they continually rely on to the singular use of the military to solve complex problems such as 21st century asymmetric warfare. “Asymmetric challenges demand asymmetric responses – political, economic, cultural, informational, and psychological tools, tactics, and techniques allowed to work organically over time,” according to Michael J. Mazarr, in “The Folly of ‘Asymmetric War.’”¹⁰⁰ 21st century asymmetric warfare requires the implementation of “full spectrum operations.” Delivering on full spectrum operations in Afghanistan today, according to General McChrystal, “requires comprehensive integration and synchronization of USG [United States Government] and ISAF [International Security Assistance Forces] civilian-military teams working across the Security, Development, and Governance Lines of Operation.”¹⁰¹ But how does the United States win the peace in Afghanistan and transition from big “M” (military only operations) to a balanced full spectrum approach conducted by U.S. civilian agencies and indigenous Afghan military and civilians?

The Answer: A New Department of Representative Governance and Peace Development (RAPDEV). Parallel to those reforms affected by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the United States needs to reorganize its National Security structure. The development of a new Department of Representative Governance and Peace Development (RAPDEV) will greatly enhance the capability to conduct full spectrum operations with the whole-of-government. This new department has precedence in that the British have already established a new cabinet-level department, the Department for International Development, designed to address the myriad governance and peace development concerns.¹⁰² Although creating a new cabinet-level position and

reorganizing the interagency may be politically complicated and costly, the United States can ill-afford to suffer the consequences of a poorly planned transition from OIF Phase III to Phase IV again. The United States must capitalize on an opportunity to provide cohesive, unified leadership across the whole-of-government.

This new department should be made up of a comprehensive, interagency team that includes civilian and military experts in the areas of cultural awareness, diplomacy, economics, international relations, language training, finance, small business, medicine, agriculture, education, justice, corrections, intelligence, military art, practical politics and leadership.¹⁰³ This new department will enable the United States to develop civil capacity within individual nation-states to address what Thomas X. Hammes, author of *The Sling and the Stone*, called for: “We have to establish banking, currency, customs, public health organizations, public sanitation, air traffic control, business regulation, a system of taxation, and every other process needed for running a modern society.”¹⁰⁴ The department should include military expertise in addition to “an active/standby civilian response capacity of 5,000 personnel backed by a reserve force of 10,000 personnel,” as recommend by Binnendijk and Cronin.¹⁰⁵

In accord with historical examples of civilian response capacities, the United States deployed 1,400 civilians during the height of the Marshall Plan in Germany, 200 to Japan after WWII, and over 2,800 to Vietnam.¹⁰⁶ At the height of the civilian surge in Iraq, over 2,000 U.S. personnel made up the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) of which up to 75 percent were civilians.¹⁰⁷ While the number of deployed civilians to Germany and Japan seems comparatively low to Iraq today, it must be recognized that these countries were already well developed, offensive operations had clearly ended

with the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan, by and large the people welcomed the United States' post-hostility assistance, and both were open to the development of representative governance and capitalist economies.¹⁰⁸

Based on these historical numbers, the U.S. Department of Representative Governance and Peace Development could surge a civilian capacity to meet the requirements of four “small” contingencies, such as HADR and Stability and Reconstruction (S&R) missions; one “medium” contingency, such as an enduring S&R mission to Iraq or Afghanistan; and one “large” contingency, such as an HADR mission to Myanmar or Port-au-Prince, Haiti.¹⁰⁹ According to Christel Fonzo-Eberhard and Richard L. Kugler in “Sizing the Civilian Response Capacity for Complex Operations,” chapter two of the National Defense University (NDU) report *Civilian Surge*, “The key point is that this force would enable the United States to surge 5,000 active/standby civilian personnel... and to sustain this presence for at least 1 year. A reserve force of 10,000 personnel would permit sustainment of this civilian surge for 2 or more years.”¹¹⁰ While the number of active, standby, and reserve personnel may at first seem daunting, one must consider that just one percent of the staffs of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, Labor, Transportation and Treasury total 6,077 personnel, well above the needed 5,000 for the active/standby civilian force.¹¹¹ Not only is the development of a permanent institution of professionals who resolve hybrid problems and think on representative governance and peace development very achievable, we can win a better peace for simply having better prepared when not at war.

Past Ideas. The scarcity of new organizations and incorporating new concepts does not appear to be a dilemma in the 21st century. Indeed, there have been numerous efforts to address interagency coordination challenges such as the formation of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Director of Foreign Assistance, and the Joint Interagency Command (JIACOM) in addition to ideas such as the Interagency Task Force (IATF).¹¹² Further, Combatant Commands have created effective organizations such as the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), but without official recognition within Washington.¹¹³ Additionally, according to Neyla Arnas in “Connecting Government Capabilities for Overseas Missions,” chapter eleven of the NDU report *Civilian Surge*, “No amount of interagency cooperation at the COCOM [Combatant Commander] level can overcome the following facts”:

- There is no civilian-led regional structure (as a COCOM counterpart) to focus on conflict prevention.
- There do not exist in the U.S. Government people who are concerned with the government as a whole and can make choices that are not turf-related.
- The commander (or, for that matter, the Ambassador) lacks real authority over other agencies represented at the command (or Embassy).
- There are impediments to coherent regional policy development and implementation caused by inconsistent geographic boundaries among U.S. Government agencies.¹¹⁴

Other organizations such as the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), inspired by the 2004 Lugar-Biden Bill, subsequently incorporated into National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, directed the State Department to take the lead for stabilization and reconstruction missions.¹¹⁵ With solid initial support, S/CRS launched valiant efforts to assemble a

rapidly deployable civilian capacity and develop civilian competence for hybrid operations.¹¹⁶ However, like many of the ideas and organizations developed to conduct hybrid operations, according to the authors of *Civilian Surge*, “The new office was underfunded, understaffed, and unappreciated within the Department of State.”¹¹⁷ As of October 2009, Congress had approved 75 million dollars for S/CRS but had not approved an additional 173 million dollars for the active and standby components of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC).¹¹⁸ It is important to note, this initial 248 million dollars was allocated only for 2009 set-up costs.¹¹⁹ Additionally, funding has yet to be approved for the reserve component of the S/CRS Civilian Response Corps.¹²⁰ Unfortunately, the “S/CRS experiment” met with bureaucratic and political resistance shortly after its creation and has languished ever since. It was simply created as a gesture for change in an unfunded, very parochial world.¹²¹

There have been other initiatives, such as the creation of a Prevention, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Cell (PRSC) within the National Security Council.¹²² Under this plan, the PRSC would subsume S/CRS.¹²³ Unfortunately, this proposal also lacked overarching unified leadership and genuine directive authority to integrate appropriate resources with an expeditionary military. Despite great strides by both Africa Command and Southern Command to develop civilian planning capacity within their commands with State Department deputies, adequate funding continues to be an issue.

The Imperatives. Five practical implementation measures will facilitate the establishment of a new Department of Representative Governance and Peace Development (RAPDEV):

- New National Security Act for the 21st Century.

First, develop a bicameral, bipartisan coalition to legislatively mandate a new National Security Act for the 21st century that addresses the future security dilemma, and the conundrum of hybrid warfare and its stronghold on 21st century conflict.¹²⁴ Capitalize on the sense of urgency generated by the failure to effectively transition from OIF Phase III to Phase IV, the unrelenting exposure to asymmetric, hybrid 21st century threats, and the emerging mission in the Afghan region. The call for reorganization will likely resonate in both the legislative and executive branches as they reflect on what is achievable in terms of government improvement.¹²⁵ Secretary Gates has himself called for a potential new National Security Act to address the problems of the 21st century of which Congress is ever more eager to consider.¹²⁶ A new National Security Act not only creates a holistic approach to solving the United States' most compelling strategic challenges but provides the justification for appropriate funding of the reforms. According to James R. Locher III, in "National Security Reform: A Prerequisite for Successful Complex Operations," "If we do not change the way we think about national security... America will fail to seize important opportunities to win friends and build partnerships around the world and will fail to respond to a growing range of increasingly diverse, complex threats from abroad."¹²⁷

- Creation of an Integrated National Security Unified Command Plan.

Second, in order to set the conditions for sound relational support for the new Department of Representative Governance and Peace Development from the Departments of State and Defense, the President should biannually publish an integrated National Security Unified Command Plan that blends both the Unified Command Plan (UCP) under the Department of Defense with the Regional Bureaus of

the Department of State. This merger will align the State Department's Regional Bureaus with Combatant Command AORs and improve both coordination and cooperation within the unified regional concepts included in the UCP. The concepts should be a collaborative effort by State, Defense, and the new Department of RAPDEV.

- Creation of Regional Ambassador Positions.

Third, establish Regional Ambassadors to oversee the corresponding bureaus and individual nation-state Ambassadors located within their respective regions outlined in the new National Security Unified Command Plan. This will allow, for example, the Central Command Combatant Commander to have an equal representative partner from State. A senior representative from the Department of RAPDEV should also be present on the bureau staff. In turn, when the President directs a transition from a future Phase III to Phase IV operation, the Combatant Commander and Regional Ambassador then smoothly transition and answer directly to the Secretary of Representative Governance and Peace Development as the lead agency, while still answering indirectly and coordinating actions through their respective Departments. This type of a supporting-and-supported relationship will ensure effective coordination among government departments. Further, this relationship is sufficiently flexible to allow, for example, the Combatant Commander to respond to the Secretary of RAPDEV during an ongoing Phase IV operation in a specific area within the Combatant Command geographic area while still subordinate to the Secretary of Defense during a simultaneous ongoing Phase III operation in another specific area within the Combatant Command geographic area.

- Conduct a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR).

Fourth, in lieu of conducting a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), expand the analysis to encompass a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR) that addresses national security plans and activities of the Departments of Defense, State, Representative Governance and Peace Development, in addition to Treasury, Agriculture, Health and Human Services and all applicable interagencies contributing to national security.¹²⁸ The QNSR will provide a greater comprehensive, holistic, unified review of the whole-of-government approach to national security. It will also identify decision-making outcomes and subsequent effects upon each of the contiguous departments.

- Education of Joint-Interagency Staff Officers.

Fifth, as important as it is for military professionals to develop joint expertise, it is equally important to develop an interagency education and cultural appreciation for the other elements of national power.¹²⁹ The Department of Defense must go beyond developing Joint Staff Officers (JSOs) and create unified interagency staffs comprised of Joint-Interagency Staff Officers (JISOs). These cohesive interagency staffs must incorporate seasoned, well practiced officers and agents; they must also provide a broad strategic perspective and appreciation for each of the elements of nation power across the whole-of-government in order to usher in a new “Interagency Age.”¹³⁰

The new Department of Representative Governance and Peace Development must, as Michael G. Krause recommends in “Square Pegs for Round Holes: Current Approaches to Future War and the Need to Adapt,” “Acquire an offshore mindset and have personnel trained and equipped to deploy their capability as rapidly as military

forces” to execute a singular, cohesive effort.¹³¹ This well-coordinated civilian-military effort may well require a doctrinal re-phasing of the operational environment. Whereas in the past, each of the phases called upon Department of Defense resourcing, perhaps only Phases Two (Seize the Initiative) and Three (Dominate the Enemy) should be directed by the Secretary of Defense as the lead agency. Phase Zero (Shaping), Phase One (Deter the Enemy), and Phase Six (Shaping) should be directed by the Secretary of State as the lead agency while Phase Four (Stabilize the Environment) and Phase Five (Enable Civil Authority) should be directed by the Secretary of Representative Governance and Peace Development as the lead agency. The imperative of employing a whole-of-government approach when conducting full spectrum operations requires coordinated action by departments organized, trained, and resourced to accomplish functionally discrete missions. The use of the military phased framework provides a useful template to assign department lead agency authority.

Final Findings. In the end, “current efforts to build a civilian response capacity for complex [hybrid] operations are unfinished and... the Obama administration needs to dedicate additional attention and resources to the task,” according to Binnendijk and Cronin.¹³² In August 2007, Candidate Obama called for an increase in “civilian capacity to promote stability and tackle security challenges with a ‘whole-of-government’ approach, so that our troops are not alone in the fight.”¹³³ While NSPD 44, like its precursor Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, set in motion a way forward for interagency coordination, we must rise above dominant, well-established interagency cultures and create a new National Security Act for the 21st century that legislatively

creates a new, fully funded Department of Representative Governance and Peace Development.¹³⁴

In order to meet future national security challenges, we must also generate the capacity to engage the full spectrum of military and interagency functions, and ensure we have an experienced, cohesive, cooperative department within the executive branch that is fully funded; that operates under dynamic, cross-functional leadership; that is capable of designing, planning, and conducting hybrid missions; and that can build capacity for representative governance and peace development.¹³⁵ Developing this capacity is well within U.S. national interests and propagates American values.¹³⁶

Conclusion

Although they welcome American values and support, Afghans today are concerned that they will be left in the cruel hands of Taliban terrorists for partnering with a nation that has lost its will to fight and departed the region. However, if we are to succeed in this new security dilemma that includes an amorphous, global, ideological enemy, American resolve must remain steady. America will not gain the trust of the local and regional Afghan populace until the Afghans believe America has the will, the capital, and the capability to win.¹³⁷

President Obama has acknowledged the urgency of this situation: "This is not a war of choice; it is a war of necessity. Those who attacked America on 9/11 are plotting to do so again. If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al-Qaeda could plot to kill more Americans."¹³⁸ Since 9/11, al-Qaeda has not created a blueprint for victory through insight and strategic level planning. Rather, their success has largely been due to our inability to confront this merciless, faceless enemy across the full spectrum of warfare. The complexity of the 21st century

security situation demands a whole-of-government approach in order to solve the foremost security challenges of this century.¹³⁹

The more the United States is able to render assistance through diplomacy, economic development or financial support, for example, the more we will find ourselves creating and developing trusted allies and partners in peace. In addition, by utilizing the full spectrum of the DIME-FIL construct in a well-orchestrated, balanced approach that capitalizes on years of experience and expertise and that deploys as an expeditionary unified civilian and military team, one could postulate the establishment of a future atmosphere ripe for worldwide representative governance and peace development. The creation of a synchronized and coordinated organization through a National Security Act that mandates a fully funded Department of Representative Governance and Peace Development presents a considerable increase in unity of effort and leadership across the full spectrum of operations.

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